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ON THE DETERMINATION OF MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
WITH ROBUST OUTCOME 
by
Christophe Deissenberg
Abstract : With particular regard to applications in macroeconometric 
policy-making, an optimization framework is presented for both 
continuous- and discrete-time systems which injects an element of 
robustness into the optimal solution: The dynamic behaviour of
selected variables is rendered less sensitive to variations of 
the system's parameters by taking into consideration appropriate 
sensitivity vectors in an augmented objective function. The 
approach's potential usefulness is explored with a small 
econometric model for Germany.
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With particular regard to applications in macroeconometric 
policy-making, an optimization framework is presented for 
both continuous- and discrete-time systems which injects 
an element of robustness into the optimal solution: The 
dynamic behaviour of selected variables is rendered less 
sensitive to variations of the system's parameters by 
taking into consideration appropriate sensitivity vectors 
in an augmented objective function. The approach's 
potential usefulness is explored with a small econometric 
model for Germany.
INTRODUCTION
In spite of the heavy criticism it has been subjected to, the mini­
mization of a welfare loss function subject to an econometric model 
of the economy considered still provides a priviledged framework for 
macroeconomic policy discussions. Within this framework, thr uncer­
tainty about the true dynamics of the economy - econometric models 
are, after all, only very imperfect descriptions of the reality- has 
usually be treated in a probabilistic manner by minimizing the 
expected value of the loss function under estimated or postulated 
distributions of the model's parameters and residuals, see e.g.
Chow (1975), (1981), Kendrick (1981). One potential weakness of 
this way of treating uncertainty is that, by definition, it is aimed 
at determining policies insuring good average results over all pos­
sible realizations of the uncertain parameters and variables. These 
policies, however, are not specifically designed to perform well or 
even acceptably in the unique historical situation in which they 




























































































specific realization of the uncertain values).
In practical macroeconomic policy-making, on the other hand, concern 
does not usually centre on the average economic performance over a 
set of possible evolutions, but on the results actually obtained in 
the periods considered. Thus, there is a natural interest in poli­
cies which not only insure a small expected welfare loss but also a 
high insensitivity of the actual economic performance to some type 
of uncertainty.
In this paper, we assume that the econometric model used in economic 
policy determination correctly reflects the structure of the economy. 
However, the estimated values of the model's parameters 
differ in an unknown manner from their true values: That is, we 
assume parameter disturbances. For increased generality, the 
parameter disturbances are taken to depend on a vector of variables 
of unknown value. We are interested in policies which - while insur­
ing a satisfactory expected economic performance - protect us 
from parameter disturbances in the following way : they should 
insure that the realized and the predicted trajectories of the variables 
of interest remain for arbitrary small disturbances closer to each- 
other than would be the case if one followed the standard "optimal" 
policies mentioned above. In other words, the policies considered 
should reduce the"trajectory sensitivity" of the controlled economy 
to small parameter variations.
The approach presented here has its roots in parametric sensitivity 
methods well known to engineers, see Frank (1978) for an overview, 
but largely ignored in the economic literature. An exception is 
the paper by Karakitsos, Rustem and Zarrop (1980). While similar 
to ours in its general philosophy, the approach proposed by these 
authors nevertheless presents an important difference: It aims at 
insuring a relative insensitivity of the optimal value of the 
objective function, and not of the optimal trajectory. In a related 
vein, Mitchell (1979) and Stdppler (1979) consider within the linear- 




























































































covariance of the expected optimal trajectory. Other authors have 
approached the problem of robust economic policies from the point of 
view of worst case policies, minimal guaranteed welfare, etc.
Since the alternative approaches proposed are very numerous and 
formally unrelated to the one presented here, they are not referred 
to in this article.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to 
the presentation of the formal sensitivity reduction problem. 
Motivated by the growing interest in continuous-time econometric 
models, see Gandolfo (1981), we first discuss the general case of 
a dynamic structure represented by a system of non-linear differen­
tial equations. We then turn to the discrete-time linear-quadratic 
case, the bread and butter of macroeconometric policy optimization.
To increase the clarity of the presentation, we disregard here the 
stochastic elements such as additive disturbances which are charac­
teristic for econometric models. Nonetheless it should be clear 
that the "deterministic treatment of uncertainty" advocated in 
this paper cannot pretend to supplant the traditional probabilistic 
approach; possibly it may complement it. Our implicit concern with 
stochastic elements explains in particular the emphasis placed in 
the paper on closed-loop policies.
In the paper's final part we present an application of the sensiti­
vity reduction method to a small econometric model for the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The numerical analysis gives insights into 
the relative importance of different model parameters for the 
trajectory sensitivity, into the trade-offs between economic 
performance and sensitivity, into the maximally attainable sensiti­
vity reduction and into the way the control efforts vary with incre­
ased sensitivity reduction. It should be noted that very little 
numerical evidence on the signification of sensitivity reduction 
in macroeconometric policy-making has yet been published, an excep­





























































































THE FORMAL PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION 
The general continuous-time case
Consider the following situation: A real system with unknown 
dynamics
(la) = fr (xj;, ut , t) =
= f (x£, ut, t, a) ! a=ar , te [o, t ] ,
r(lb) x q = a given,
is modelled by the estimated system 
(2a) x£ = fn(x£, ufc, t) =
= f(xj, ufcf t,a) | a=an , te[o, t ] ,
(2b) xn = a given, o
where for every te [o, T^
x^ is a nxl state vector, 
ufc is a mxl control vector,
a11 is the estimated value of a scalar time-independent parameter 
a whose true value ar is unknown.
The only difference between the true system (1) and the estimated 
system (2) lies in the value of the parameters a. The future 
values xj, t>0, are to be understood as forecasted values, 
based on the knowledge of the estimated model and on the known
values (true=estimated) of the current state x q . The state xfc incor­
porates all relevant information on the system's history up to t£0.
The solution {x^} of (1) will be called the actual or real state 
trajectory, the solution {x1̂} of (2) the predicted trajectory. These 
solutions are assumed to exist, to be unique, bounded, and continu­




























































































tion insuring that these assumptions are fulfilled are standard and 
shall not be elaborated upon here.
Note that we do not distinguish between real and predicted controls.
That is, we assume that the controls are always physically realized 
as planned. This assumption, however, can easily be relaxed.
Moreover, it does not preclude the possibility that for some or all 
t the controls ufc are determined as functions of (perfect or imper­
fect) observations of the real state trajectory up to t. That is, 
feedback control is acceptable. Note that we assume for simplici­
ty's sake that perfect observations of the current real state are 
available in each period.
The discrepancy
... . r n(3) Aa := a - a
between the known estimated value an of a and its unknown true value 
ur will be called parameter disturbance. Let Ax^ designate the 
state disturbance in t resulting from the parameter disturbance 
Aa:
(4) Axfc := x£ - x^ , te [o, t ]
Note that the model disturbances Aa and Ax̂ _ are functions of the 
true values and thus unknown.
Since x£ and x^ are continuous in a, the disturbance Axt is also 
continuous in a • We shall further assume that it can be expressed 
trough Taylor expansion of f around its estimated value as:
3x 32xt
(5) Ax. = -—  • Aa + — -— —  * (Aa)2 + .... ,t 9a 2 9a
where all the derivatives are evaluated at a=an .
For sufficiently small parameter disturbances Aa, one may neqlect without 




























































































-  6 -
for Axt the linear expression
(6) Axfc t i(ifc. Aa , tejo, t J ,
where ’I'*. := 3x^ /3a, n is the n x 1 sensitivity vector
z t |a = a ---------- *-------
for period t.
The class of disturbances Aa for which the approximation of (5) by 
(6) is acceptable must, of course, be determined in the context of 
each concrete case.
To the first order, governs the state disturbance Axfc resulting 
from a parameter disturbance Aa. Specifically, its i-th coordinate 
expresses the sensitivity of the i-th state variable in t with 
respect to a marginal pertubation of a.
It is important for us that ij; depends only on estimated values and
thus can be'computed, even though the true system is unknown.
Specifically, ij> can be obtained for all t's as the solution of
the differential equation obtained by differentiating (2) with
respect to a. (Under the assumptions made, this solution exists,
is unique and continuous). We shall distinguish two cases accord-
x*ing to whether the controls ufc depend on a or not:
Case I : 3û _ /3a = 0 for all t. That is, {ut} does not depend
X“on the real state trajectory {x^} : the controls ufc are determined 
open-loop for all t. In that case we designate by and call 
it open-loop sensitivity. One has
(7a) p> = 3f 3f r i ~ i —  , te 0, Tlt 3xfc t 3a L ' J
(7b) Po = 0.
Case II : 3u / 3a / 0 for some t. This is always the case when 
ufc is determined as a function of (some measurement of) {xt} • In 
this case, will be called closed-loop sensitivity and deno­




























































































. , , 3fn . 3fn 3ut, 9fn(8a) 6 = (-—  + -—  -— )o + ---t 3x 3ufc 3x t 3a
3fn 3u,
3u 3T  ' t£[°' T] '
(8b) oQ = 0 .
In (7) and (8), all derivatives are taken at a = an.
Equation (7) is of course a trivial special case of (8). The reason 
for distinguishing and o will become apparent at a later point. 
Whenever this distinction is not essential, we shall keep using the 
symbol i(j to designate either open-loop or closed-loop sensitivity.
Equation (7) resp. (8) defines a (linear) sensitivity model which 
parallels the (linear or non-linear) process model (2). Indeed the 
sensitivity model is of the same order and of the same dimension as 
the original model.
The sensitivity model is ignored in economic optimization problems 
as usually formulated: The "classical economic optimization prob­
lem" or primary problem P can broadly be characterized as follows:
1 Using the estimated model (2) as a constraint, find a strategywhich minimizes a welfare loss functionP fT P n J = I 3 (*t, ufc, t)dt.
The function Jp expresses the economic or social costs of following 
a given control strategy.
PTwo things are to be noted here: The loss function J is
a) a function of the estimated values of the economic varia­
bles; but not
b) of the state disturbances Axfc. These disturbances do not 
play any role in the optimization calculation, either di­
rectly or indirectly.
Of course, this does not mean that there are no sensitivity consid­
erations in theoretical or applied economic analysis. What we are 
suggesting here is that in the macroeconometric policy-making con­




























































































optimization problem from the outset and not treated as an ex post 
test of how robust solutions are.
Consider now the problem of finding a control strategy such that the 
resulting real trajectory remains in some sense as close as possible 
to the predicted one; this, for arbitrary small parameter disturbances 
Aa. In this problem {x^} is no longer of importance. The state 
perturbations {Ax^} are now the object of the control.
However, since Ax^ is a function of the unknown parameter disturb­
ance Aa, it is not possible to control Axfc directly. One may con­
trol it indirectly, though, by minimizing a suitable norm of the 
sensitivity vector ij> . Thus the pure sensitivity reduction problem 
may be expressed in fairly general terms as
I Using the estimated model (7) (open-loop case) or (8) (closed-loop case) as constraint, find a control strategy which mini-S fT smizes an appropriate function J = j (\p , u , t)dt.
Assuming now that the decision-maker is interested in a compromise 
between pure predicted performance maximization in the sense of P on 
the one hand, and pure trajectory sensitivity reduction in the sense 
of S on the other, we consider in this paper a combined problem C
J = JP + AJS -* min , A > 0 
subject to (2) and (7) or (8).
The weight A expresses the relative importance given to sensitivity 
reduction, with the two polar cases A = 0 (corresponding to the pri­
mary problem) and A = 00 (i.e., pure sensitivity reduction). Note 
P Sthat in general J and J will be concurring objectives; it is by no 
means certain that, in a given problem, a significant reduction in 
sensitivity can be achieved without unacceptable loss in primary 
performance.
In the open-loop case, the combined problem C is standard and does 
not need to be further elaborated upon. On the other hand, problems 




























































































that case, o , depends on the control strategy used. Thus the opti­
mal feedback rule as a result of the optimization is needed in the 
problem formulation in order to properly define o^. In some cases 
it will be possible to solve this problem by approximating by p 
in the closed-loop sensitivity problem. However, o may be so dif­
ferent from that the addition of terms involving p in the com­
bined performance index J may be detrimental rather than beneficial; 
see Kreindler (1968). One will then have to resort to more or less 
elaborate numerical solution procedures, depending on the specific 
class of problems studied.
Remarks;
i) For simplicity's sake we considered only the case of a 
scalar parameter a. When a is a kxl vector, one may derive k sensi­
tivity models in the format (7) or (8)— each one of these models be­
ing associated to one coordinate of a— and take into consideration
Sthe k corresponding nxl sensitivity vectors in J . Alternatively, 
instead of the k partial derivatives 8x^ / Bct̂ , one may use a single 
directional derivative Sx^ / <5a in a given direction 6ot. The prob­
lem then is equivalent to the scalar one. We follow this last ap-
Sproach in the numerical part. When J is restricted to the (fairly 
general) form JS = E E y ̂ 11 J8x̂  / 3 ot. |J , the two approaches are basically 
equivalent, the problem of determining appropriate weights for
the k sensitivity vectors 3x£/3a in the first case corresponding to 
the problem of finding proper directions in the second. Of
course, the basic problem of finding a weighting scheme (a direction) 
reflecting in a satisfactory way the preferences of the decision­
maker (or more pragmatically: leading to sensible solutions) may be 
extremly harduous to solve in practice.
ii) The approach can be immediately extended to cover a) the 
case of (slowly) time-varying parameters a; and b) the case of dis­





























































































iii) A formal requirement for a senseful application of the 
sensitivity reduction method is: The underlying model must be structur­
ally stable. Loosely speaking, a dynamic system is structurally stable 
when small perturbations of its parameters do not essentially modify 
its qualitative behaviour. See Varian (1981), pp. 107-107, for a 
more formal definition of the concept and for further references.
The point will not be pursued here. Note, however, that it is 
reasonable to expect1 from any econometric model that it is structur­
ally stable. Furthermore, it is generally possible to cope with 
structural instability through simple extension of the original 
model, see Frank (1978).
iv) Since we are working in the time domain, the sensitivity 
expressions used here do depend on the values taken by the exogenously 
determined variables. To obtain results which depends exclusively 
orwfche system's structure one has to work in the frequency domain.
In this context we will like to mentionned here the corresponding 
work on pole placement conducted by the Cambridge Control Group 
around McFarlane.
The discrete-time linear-quadratic case
The primary problem. The primary linear-quadratic problem PLQ con­






























































































(9) JP = E ^(x ~ x )'KP (x - x ) -*■ min
t=1 u., ..., u1 T
subject to the linear econometric model in state
variable form
P P P(10a) = A xfc  ̂ + B ut + C z ,
(10b) x = a given, o
where
"1" denotes transposition,
x and u are the nxl predicted state vector and the mx1 
control vector,
x^ is a given vector of desired values for x^,
z is a qxl vector of given exogenous variables,
Kp is a given nxn symmetric positive semi-definite ma­
trix,
P P PA , B and C are given estimated coefficient matrices of ap 
propriate dimensions.
P P PThe matrices A , B and C may depend on time.
All values in (9) — (10) are estimated (predicted). To simplify the nota-
tion, however, we do not use the superscript "n". Furthermore, we assume 
without loss of generality, following Chow (1975), that u is in­
cluded in x^ as a subvector. That is, xfc has the form xfc = (x^u^)'.
Linear-quadratic control problems of the type (9)-(10) play a cen­
tral role in connection with the optimal control of macroeconomic 
models for analysis and policy determination purposes; see again 
Chow (1975), (1981). The optimal solution of PLQ can be expressed
in the form of a linear feedback of the current state,
(11) u* = CP xt_1 + gP , t = 1, ..., T .
Here and in the following a star * denotes an optimal value.
The sensitivity equations. We assume that the coefficient matrices 





























































































their estimated values A , B and C correspondina to a = a . In com­
plete analogy to the continuous-time case, one can then derive a
linear first-order difference equation for 3x / 3a =: f  ,t t
t = 1, T. Differentiating (10) with respect to a, one obtains
in the open-loop case
(12a)
3^
3a = Pfc «
3AP P 3BP 3CP
3^rxt-i + A pt-i + a ^ t + ^ r zt T ,
(12b) 0 .
Here, and in the following, all derivatives are taken at the estimated 
values.
In the case of a linear feedback of the form (11), substituting (11) 
for u in (10) and differentiating the resulting expression with re­






°t  * ^  v i  * (A
P P
B V ° t - 1
P3B P + ---q3a yt
T ,
a = 0 . o
5The sensitivity problem.. We assume that the criterion J to be min-
pimized in the sensitivity problem is of the same type as J , i.e. 
quadratic in the sensitivity terms, both because the quadratic norm 
is in most cases as good a measure for trajectory sensitivity as any 
and for computational simplicity. The trajectory sensitivity reduc­
tion problem is accordingly given by
(SLQ)
T
(14) JS = Z j f ' RS T ■» min 
t=1
subject to the appropriate equation of motion for 4*̂ , 
i.e. , to (12) or (13).




























































































T 1 Ses E — (Aa)zH'' K 4\ , where this last expression approximates for
t=1 T 1 Ssmall Aa's the expression E -̂(Ax )'K (Ax ) . That is, SLQ is an
t=1
adequate formulation for the problem of finding a control strategy 
which "minimizes Axt" for small parameter disturbances Aa.
The combined problem. In the open-loop case, one obtains immediate­
ly for the combined problem CLQ^L
(CLQ0L)
where
(15) J = JP + AJS = E j  (x -x )'KP (x -x ) + p'AKSp =
_/| ^  t  t  t  U U t
1
= 2(yt-yt),K(yt - V
subject to
(15a) yt = Ayt-1 + Bufc + Czfc , t = 1, ..., T , 
(16b) yn = â ,
y = \ - \  - 'St l- ' a = I—  ' yt = —
) l ° l I °
_kp _;_o 
o ; aks
' AP i 0 \II<
V act : A /
B =
1 „ p  \ P \
\ c  - c  _\
p ' c "p9B 1 9C
\ 9a / ^9a
The optimal solution of CLQ0L has the form
(17) u* = Gtyfc_1 + g^ = G + G~ ptt-1 tKt-1 yt *
Using (17) to control the real dynamic system by feedback, however, 
may not lead to the desired sensitivity reduction since in that case 
the trajectory sensitivity is no longer given by pfc, but by
(18a) a . = (9 A 9a
9BP 1 + (A BPGt)0t-1
P




































































































which is obtained by using (17) to substitute for u in (16) and
differentiating the resulting expression with respect to a. On the 
other hand, it is impossible to formulate the "correct" closed-loop 
combined problem directly, since this requires knowledge of the op­
timal solution of this problem.
In order to stay in the linear-quadratic framework (a strong incen­
tive for doing so being the widespread use of the corresponding al­
gorithms in macroeconometric policy optimization), we do not try in 
the numerical part to derive an exact solution to the closed-loop 
combined problem. We use instead the following simple iterative 
procedure suggested by Kreindler (1968): At each iteration k one
solves the open-loop problem CLQ0L with A replaced in period t by
thus indirectly insuring closed-loop sensitivity reduction. This 
procedure worked satisfactorily in the problems we now present.
A NUMERICAL APPLICATION
The econometric model and the primary problem
In this section we present some numerical results obtained by apply­
ing the approach outlined above to a small linear econometric model 
for Germany, the Uebe model. This model is discussed in detail in
1 2where Gt (k-1), Gt (k-1) are the optimal feedback matrices determined 
at iteration k-1. In other words, one approximates o by
( 2 0 )
Stbppler and Deissenberg (1977), where it is used in diverse optimal 




























































































duction exercise corresponds to "Run 1" in this previous article.
It is also a slightly simplified version of the model which under­
lies the numerical part of the StOppler (1979) paper on covariance 
reduction mentioned in the introduction. We refer to these earlier 
papers for specifics on the structure and properties of the Uebe 
model and for a complete description of the primary problem (Run 1).
pThe objective function J of the primary problem is a quadratic loss
pfunction with diagonal weighting matrix K . The planning horizon is 
T=10. The variables entering the objective function of the primary 
problem are listed for convenience in Table 1, together with the 
corresponding weights and desired values and with other endogenous 
variables of importance. In the table, designates the (wildly 
fluctuating) historical values of the exports of goods and services 
in current prices. The variables G, R and TY are control variables. 
All variables except R are defined as growth rates.
TABLE 1
Main variables of the Uebe model
Desired value Weight
Y: Gross social product i.c.p.
M: Import of goods and services i.c.p.
A: Total number employed
PY: Price index of gross social product
(1962 = 100)
G: Government expenditures i.c.p.
R: Discount rate
TY: Indirect taxes minus subsidies
D: Amortization i.c.p.
Q: Gross income from entrepreneurial
activity and assets
LD: Net income from non-independent work






































































































Sensitivity analysis: The cumulative sensitivity coefficients s
In the numerical application we assumed the true value of the matrix 
C to be known exactly and restricted our attention to disturbances 
of the matrices A and B. Before tackling the sensitivity reduction 
proper, we conducted the following simple, but revealing sensitivity 
analysis.
Let x^ be the h-th state variable and x its value in period t. A
measure for the influence of a small disturbance of an element a,.il
TABLE 2
The critical parameters of the model for selected values of x^









aY,D 106 aPY, D 115 aM,D 115
aY,Q 92 aPY,Q 98 aM,Q 98
aY,QD 75 aPY,QD 81 aM,QD 81
bY,G 65 bPY, G 71 bM,G 71
aY,Y 43 apY, Y 45 aY,D 59
bY,R 37 bPY, R 41 aY,Q 46
aLQ,D 25 aPY,LQ 22 aM,Y 45
aY,LQ 21 aQ,D 1 6 bM,R 41
aLQ,Q 19 aPY, A 15 bY,D 37
bLD,G 16 aQ,Q 12 aY,QD 37
aLQ,QD 16 bPY,TY 11 aQD,D 30
V A 15 bQ,G 10 aY,Y 24
aA,D 15 aQ/QD 10 aQD,Q 23
aA,Q 11 aY,D 6 aM,LQ 22
bY , TY 11 aQ,Y 6 bY,G 21
bA,G 11 aA,D 6 bQD ,R 19
aLQ,Y 10 bR,R 5 aQD,QD 19






























































































(or b̂ _. of B) on the trajectory of
s (a. . ) = I | Ax, . / Aa . . 
*h 13 t-i ht 13
is
The so defined coefficients s were calculated with Aa^j “ 0*0^ a ĵ
for all state variables x, and all 99 non-zero elements of A and B,h
using the optimal feedback rule of Run 1 to generate x^ given x^ ^,
0 < t £ T. The elements of A resp. B corresponding to the NK high­
est values of s for a given x^, that is, the critical parameters of
the model, are listed in Table 2 for different values of x, andh
NK = 18. In this table, ay D designates the parameter located in
"row Y" and "column D" of matrix A, etc. Thus ay ^ expresses the
direct "impact" of D, . on Y,.t-1 t
The results are not basically different for other choices of x^.
They vividly illustrate the generally recognized predominance of de­
preciation D and entrepreneurial income Q,QD in the model's dynam­
ics. In the same vein, they suggest that G is the control variable 
with the strongest potential for giving rise to state disturbances; 
it is followed by the discount rate R.
The combined problem
In all optimizations presented here, a is defined as the vector of
the NK critical parameters of A and B with respect to some state
variable x, . When not stated otherwise, NK = 18 and x, = Y. In h h
other words, the sensitivity reduction problem is taken to be the 
problem of countering the effect of perturbations of the 18 parame­
ters of A and B most important for the behaviour of Y in the sense 
of (21). No dimensionality problem arises from the definition of a 
as a vector, as we use a directional derivative 6xfc / 6a in direc­
tion of the unit vector instead of NK partial derivatives 3x^ / 3a..
S t  JThe sensitivity weighting matrix K is the unity matrix in all ex­
periments; in every case presented T = 10.
SThe choice of the unit matrix for K and of the unit vector as di­




























































































choices may appear more natural or better justifiable. One might 
for example define the direction of 6a in function of the empirical 
variances of the model's parameters; or weight the sensitivity terms 
corresponding to Y more heavily than those corresponding to other 
variables, since the choice of Y as "reference variable" in the de­
termination of the critical parameters hints at a particular inter­
est in the corresponding trajectory sensitivity. Such more compli­
cated weighting schemes were used in alternative experiments; they 
did not lead to results qualitatively different from those presented 
here.
As scalar measures for the importance of open-loop and closed-loop 
sensitivity, in the following we use the variables
10 10
(22) RHO := Z p'p , SIG := E o'5 ,
t=1 t=1
10
CON := E o'a t=1 t
where resp. afc designates the elements of which do not (do) 
correspond to 6u^ /6a.
Results
In all optimization experiments the approximation of o by p was sat- 
isfactory except for very large values of X— this point will be dis­
cussed in more detail later. Most important, ofc kept pace with p^ 
as RHO decreased with increasing values of X. This is reflected in 
Figures 1 and 2 (Figure 2 being essentially a blow-up of Figure 1).
Both figures suggest that the practically relevant trade-offs be­
tween sensitivity reduction and primary economic performance are to
4be found in the approximate range 10 £ X < 10 . For smaller values
of X one hardly observes any sensitivity reduction or increase in
4the welfare loss. For values of X superior to 10 seemingly negli­
gible reductions of RHO and SIG become exceedingly costly in terms 
P 2of J . Only in the range 10 £ X < 10 can one observe a strong sen­




























































































mary performance. The "relevant trade-off range" appears fairly in­
dependent of the number of critical parameters considered; see Fig­
ure 3. However, both the open-loop and the closed-loop sensitivi­
ties increase and their reduction becomes more costly with large 
values of NK.
The results presented are those obtained after the second iteration 
according to (19). Further iterations bring only minor improvements 
with them. Moreover, one should note that the approximation of o by 
p breaks down and that the iterative updating according to (20) di­
verges for large values of X. The values of X for which this hap-
5 7pens are lower, the larger NK is (ca. X = 10 for NK = 30, X = 10 
for NK = 18, ...). A possible reason for this may be found in Table 
3, which refers again to the situation NK = 18: Beginning approxi-
matively with X = 10^, the importance of the closed-loop 
control sensitivity 6û _ / 6a (expressed by CON) relative to the 
non-contrdL sensitivity (expressed by SIG) increases sharply. However,
the non-control sensitivity is ignored in the open-loop formulation. In any 
case, the divergence problem for large X's does not appear serious,
since it occurs for values of X which presumably lie outside the 
practically relevant range.
Table 3 shows also how the control effort varies with X. One should
recognize, however, that an economically meaningful comparison of
Pthe control effort values or of any other value derived from J pre-
Psupposes that J is a correct representation of the "true" economic 
preferences over the whole set of trajectories considered. We shall 
not discuss here the associated difficulties.
Finally, Figures 4-6 show the optimal open-loop trajectories of the
3 4control variables for X = 0, X = 10 and X = 10 . Reduced sensitiv­
ity seems to imply both a diminution of the government's expendi­
tures and" a more expansive monetary policy as expressed by a lower 
discount rate. The changes in the optimal values of the (somewhat 






























































































Control efforts and relative importance of the control sensitivity 
CON/SIG (in%) Control effort
N




1 0 0.8 76
102 0.7 70
103 0.8 72




To a certain extent Figures 4-6 are misleading. Not all the co­
efficients of the matrix and the optimal values of the control 
variables change monotonically as X is increased from 0 to higher 
values. Reversals of the direction of change are possible (we ob­
served at most one such reversal for any given element of Gfc). At 
the moment we cannot exclude that this behaviour results from the 
fact that we derive an approximative solution rather than from basic 
properties of the optimal solution's structure.
Very similar results to those presented here are obtained if one 
bases the definition of the critical parameters on another variable 
x^ rather than on Y. In addition to the optimization mentioned here 
we conducted different deterministic and stochastic simulations to 
study the trajectory disturbances resulting from large and/or random 
parameter disturbances. These simulations strongly suggest that the 
sensitivity reduction approach presented here, although formally 
based on small parameter disturbances, effectively reduces the tra­
jectory sensitivity even in the case of fairly large (-10% or more) 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































the objective function is simultaneously reduced. These numerical
results will be presented in a subsequent paper together with some
related analytical results.
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